Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - Alexander, Paul (2012-06-05) by unknown
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
NYS Supreme Court Decisions in Article 78 
Proceedings Court Litigation Documents 
September 2021 
Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - Alexander, Paul 
(2012-06-05) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pdd 
Recommended Citation 
"Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - Alexander, Paul (2012-06-05)" (2021). Parole Information 
Project 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pdd/159 
This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Court Litigation Documents at FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in NYS Supreme Court 
Decisions in Article 78 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of 
Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Matter of Alexander v Evans
2012 NY Slip Op 31869(U)
June 5, 2012
Sup Ct, St. Lawrence County
Docket Number: 137461
Judge: S. Peter Feldstein
Republished from New York State Unified Court
System's E-Courts Service.
Search E-Courts (http://www.nycourts.gov/ecourts) for
any additional information on this case.
This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official
publication.
STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT        COUNTY OF ST. LAWRENCE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X
In the Matter of the Application of
PAUL ALEXANDER,#08-A-4112,
                           Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 DECISION AND JUDGMENT
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules RJI #44-1-2011-0789.36
INDEX #137461
           -against-                                             ORI # NY044015J              
          
ANDREA EVANS, Chairwoman, NYS
Board of Parole,
      Respondent.      
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X
This proceeding was originated by the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Paul
Alexander, filed in the St. Lawrence County Clerk’s office on October 31, 2011.  Petitioner,
who is an inmate at the Gouverneur  Correctional Facility, is challenging the February
2011 determination denying him parole and directing that he be held for an additional 24
months.  The Court issued an Order to Show Cause on November 4, 2011 and as a part
thereof this proceeding was converted into a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article
78 of the CPLR. 
The Court has received and reviewed respondent’s Answer/Return, including
confidential Exhibits B and C, verified on December 16, 2011, as well as petitioner’s
undated Reply thereto, filed in the St. Lawrence County Clerk’s office on December 29,
2011.  By Letter Order dated January 23, 2012 chambers provided counsel for the
respondent with copies of numerous letters that had been mailed by petitioner directly
to chambers.  In view of these mailings the Court found it appropriate to permit
respondent to submit such additional answering papers as she deemed advisable.  The1
 The Letter Order of January 23, 2012 also notified petitioner that it was inappropriate for him to1
send ex parte correspondence to the Court and/or to submit correspondence to the Court addressing the
substance of the pending proceeding outside the context of his pleadings.  Accordingly, additional materials
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Court has since received and reviewed petitioner’s Amended Reply, dated both
January 25, 2012 and January 31, 2012, filed in the St. Lawrence County Clerk’s office on
February 7, 2012, as well as counsel for the respondent’s Letter Memorandum of
February 3, 2012, filed in the St. Lawrence County Clerk’s office on February 13, 2012.
On July 17, 2007 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, New York County,
as a second felony offender, to a controlling indeterminate sentence of 3 to 6 years upon
his convictions, following a jury trial, of the crimes of Bribery 3° and Unlawful Possession
of Marijuana.   Petitioner’s conviction and sentencing were affirmed on direct appeal to2
the Appellate Division, First Department.  People v. Alexander, 72 AD3d 559, lv den 15
NY3d 746, recon den 15 NY3d 801. Having been denied merit parole release in August of
2010, petitioner made his initial regular appearance before a Parole Board on February 15,
2011.  Following that appearance a decision was rendered denying him discretionary
release and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months.  The parole denial
determination reads as follows:
“PAROLE IS AGAIN DENIED.  A REVIEW OF THE RECORD, THE I.O.
[Instant Offense] BRIBERY 3RD AND THE FILE IN ITS ENTIRETY
LEAVES THE PANEL TO FIND YOUR RELEASE INCOMPATIBLE WITH
THE PUBLIC SAFETY AND WELFARE.  YOUR 30 YEAR CRIMINAL
HISTORY INDICATES AN ESTABLISHED PATTERN OF CRIMINAL
BEHAVIOR.  ABSOLUTELY NOTHING HAS DETERRED YOU FROM
CONTINUING TO DISREGARD THE LAW WHEN FREE IN SOCIETY. 
CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO YOUR POSITIVE
INSTITUTIONAL ADJUSTMENT AND BEHAVIOR, LETTERS OF
SUPPORT AND PAROLE PLANS, HOWEVER, THIS PANEL REMAINS
CONCERNED ABOUT YOUR CONTINUED LAWLESSNESS.  WE
received from petitioner after January 23, 2012 were not considered by the Court, with the exception of his
Amended Reply. 
 As noted by the 2007 sentencing court, the Bribery 3° and Unlawful Possession of Marijuana2
convictions arose from an incident where  petitioner, who had been previously convicted of sex offenses, was
pulled over because of irregularities in the temporary license plates on the car he was driving.  There were
teenage girls in the car and marijuana was found on petitioner’s person.  The Bribery 3°conviction was based
upon petitioner’s offer of cash to the arresting officer.
2 of 9
[* 2]
CONCLUDE BASED ON YOUR HISTORY THERE IS A REASONABLE
PROBABILITY YOU WOULD NOT LIVE AND REMAIN AT LIBERTY
WITHOUT VIOLATING THE LAW.”
The parole denial determination was affirmed on administrative appeal with the final
determination apparently mailed to the petitioner and his counsel on September 16, 2011.
At the time of petitioner’s February 15, 2011 parole interview  Executive Law §259-
i(2)(c)(A) provided, in relevant part, as follows: “Discretionary release on parole shall not
be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while
confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness
of his crime as to undermine respect for law.  In making the parole release decision, the
guidelines adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered:  (i) the institutional record including
program goals and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education,
training or work assignments, therapy and interpersonal relationships with staff and
inmates . . . [and] (iii) release plans including community resources, employment,
education and training and support services available to the inmate . . .” In addition to the
above factors, where, as here, the minimum period of imprisonment was established by
the sentencing court, the pre-March 31, 2011 version of Executive Law§259-i(2)(c)(A)
incorporated by reference the pre-March 31, 2011 version of Executive Law §259-i(1)(a), 
requiring the Board to also consider “ . . . the seriousness of the offense with due
consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the
sentencing court, district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the pre-sentence probation
report as well as consideration of any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities
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following arrest and prior to confinement; and . . .prior criminal record, including the
nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .” See pre-March 31, 2011 versions of
Executive Law §§259-i(2)(c)(A) and 259-i(1)(a).
 Executive Law §259-i(1) was repealed and Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) was
amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §§38-f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011. 
The amendments to Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) included the incorporation of relevant
language from repealed Executive Law §259-i(1)(a) with respect to consideration of the
seriousness of the underlying offense and the inmate’s prior criminal record.  Thus, as of
March 31, 2011, Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct
or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of
society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for
the law.  In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted pursuant to
subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the
following be considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals and
accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education, training or work
assignments, therapy and interactions with staff and inmates . . .(iii) release plans
including community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with due
consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the
sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the presentence
probation report as well as consideration of any mitigating and aggravating factors, and
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activities following arrest prior to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including
the nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
At the time of petitioner’s February 15, 2011 Parole Board interview Executive Law 
§259-c(4) provided, in relevant part, that the Board of Parole shall “ . . .establish written
guidelines for its use in making parole decisions as required by law . . . Such written
guidelines may consider the use of a risk and needs assessment instrument to assist
members of the state board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to
parole supervision . . .”  Executive Law §259-c(4) was amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C,
subpart A, §38-b, effective September 30, 2011 , to provide that the New York State Board3
of Parole shall “ . . .establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as
required by law.  Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principals to
measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of
success of such persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in
determining which inmates maybe released to parole supervision . . .”  (Emphasis added).
Petitioner initially appears to argue that the Parole Board failed to give adequate
consideration to, and/or address, his assertion that he was, in fact, innocent of the
underlying bribery charges.  This Court, however, rejects such argument.  Although the
circumstances of the criminal act underlying an inmate’s incarceration in DOCCS custody
is a relevant consideration at a discretionary parole release interview, it is not the proper
role of the Board, or this Court for that matter, to make an independent determination as
 In the petition it is asserted that the amendment to Executive Law §259-c(4) became effective on3
September 1, 2011.  This assertion is incorrect.  L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, section 49(f) provides that
“. . . the amendments to subdivision 4 of section 259-c of the executive law made by section thirty-eight-b
of this act shall take effect six months after it shall have become a law . . .”  Since the underlying legislation
was enacted on March 31, 2011, the amendment to Executive Law §259-c(4) became effective as of
September 30, 2011 (or October 1, 2011).
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to whether or not the parole candidate was actually guilty of the crime for which he/she
was convicted.  Thus, in the case at bar, although the Board afforded petitioner more than
adequate opportunity to discuss the events associated with the arrest that ultimately led
to his Bribery 3° conviction, the Board properly alerted the petitioner that it did not
intend to retry the criminal case and properly directed petitioner to “move on” when it
was perceived that petitioner was continuing to over-focus the parole interview on the
issue of his guilt or innocence.  As noted to previously, petitioner’s July 17, 2007
conviction/sentencing was affirmed on direct appeal to the Appellate Division, First
Department, and the Court of Appeals twice, in effect, denied his application for leave to
appeal to that court.  People v. Alexander, 72 AD3d 559, lv den 15 NY3d 746, recon den
15 NY3d 801.  
A portion of the remainder of the petition is focused, in one way or another, upon
the argument that the Parole Board failed to give adequate consideration to statutory
factors other than the nature/circumstances of the crimes underlying petitioner’s current
incarceration and his criminal history.  In this regard petitioner asserts that “ . . . he has
taken all the mandated programs plus extra ones and not gotten into any trouble so what
more does the parole board want . . .[I]f the parole board had focused on all that I have
done while incarcerated they should have let me go.”
 Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259-
i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety.  See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d
614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051.  Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
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requirements.  See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
 A parole board need not assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is required
to consider in connection with a discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to
expressly discuss each of those factors in its written decision.  See Martin v. New York
State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152, Porter v. Dennison, 33 AD3d 1147 and Baez v.
Dennison, 25 AD3d 1052, lv den 6 NY3d 713.  As noted by the Appellate Division, Third
Department, the role of a court reviewing a parole denial determination “...is not to assess
whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether the
Board followed the statutory guidelines and rendered a determination that is supported,
and not contradicted, by the facts in the record.  Nor could we effectively review the
Board’s weighing process, given that it is not required to state each factor that it considers,
weigh each factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior. 
Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, 1296 (citations omitted). 
In the case at bar, a review of the Inmate  Status Report and transcript of the parole
interview  reveals that the Board had before it information with respect to the appropriate
statutory factors including petitioner’s receipt of an Earned Eligibility Certificate, his
therapeutic programming, vocational achievements,  disciplinary record, release plans,
as well as the circumstances of the crime underlying his incarceration and prior criminal
record.  See Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828.  The Court, moreover, finds nothing in the
transcript to suggest that the Board cut short petitioner’s discussion of any relevant factor
or otherwise prevented him from expressing clear and complete responses to its inquiries. 
In view of the above, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the parole board failed to
consider the relevant statutory factors.  See Davis v. Lemons, 73 AD3d 1354, and Pearl
v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1058.   Since the requisite statutory factors
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were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary parole
denial determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the denial determination
in this case was affected by irrationality bordering on impropriety as a result of the
emphasis placed by the Board on the nature of the crimes underlying his current
incarceration and his criminal history.  See Id.
Petitioner’s next argument is that the Parole Board, in rendering the February 16,
2011 parole denial determination, failed to implement the procedures referenced in
Executive Law §259-c(4) as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §38-b. 
According to petitioner, “[t]he new law states that what the parole board should consider
is all the things that a person has done while incarcerated to better himself, and not focus
so much solely on a person [sic] past Criminal History . . .”  In support of this argument
petitioner cites the December 21, 2011 determination of the Supreme Court, Orange
County, in Thwaites v. New York State Board of Parole, 34 Misc 3d 694. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the 2011 amendment to Executive Law §259-c(4) was
designated by the legislature as taking effect on September 30, 2012, the Thwaites court
found that the amendment had to be applied retroactively to Mr. Thwaites’ March 16,
2010 parole denial determination.  This Court, however, respectively disagrees with the
conclusions of the Thwaites court and, for the reasons set forth in the March 6, 2012
Decision and Judgment of the Supreme Court, Albany County (Hon. Richard M. Platkin)
in Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, ___ Misc 3d___, 2012 Slip Op 22112,
finds no basis to apply the amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4) in reviewing the
parole denial determination of February 16, 2012.  As stated by the Hamilton court, “[i]t
is apparent . . . that the State Legislature considered the question of the effectiveness of
the 2011 Amendments and determined that the new procedures contemplated by the
amendments to Executive Law §259-c(4) should not be given effect with respect to
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administrative proceedings conducted prior to October 1, 2011.”  Id at ___.  In the case
at bar, as was the case in Hamilton, the challenged parole denial determination was
rendered and the administrative appeal was denied prior to the September 30, 2012
effective date of the amendment to Executive Law §259-c(4).
Finally, the Court finds no basis to overturn the February 16, 2011 parole denial
determination, with an additional 24-month hold, simply by reason of the facts that
petitioner’s established guideline range was 20 to 36 months  and he had already been4
incarcerated for approximately 35 months as of the February 15, 2011 parole release
interview. The guideline ranges established pursuant to 9 NYCRR §8001.3 “ . . . are
intended only as a guide, and are not a substitute for the careful consideration of the many
circumstances of each individual case.”  9 NYCRR §8001.3(a).  The Court finds, moreover,
in spite the fact that the parole denial determination of February 16, 2011 effectively
resulted in the petitioner being held in DOCCS custody beyond his established guideline
range, such parole denial determination contained sufficient detail to inform petitioner
of the reasons for the denial of his request for discretionary parole release.  See 9 NYCRR
§8001.3(c), Davis v. Travis, 292 AD2d 742, lv dis  98 NY2d 669, and Richards v. Travis,
288 AD2d 604.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.   
Dated: June 5, 2012 at
Indian Lake, New York ___________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Justice, Supreme Court
 In the petition it is asserted that the guideline range was 24 to 30 months.  This assertion is4
incorrect.
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